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This paper assesses the technical performance of Brazilian banks while accounting for risk, which is considered as
an undesirable outcome of banking. To this end, frontier techniques based on Data Envelopment Analysis and
directional distance functions are applied to a sample of 124 banks and data for the six-year period 2014–19. Our
main finding is that the Brazilian banking industry could notably increase its production of conventional outputs
without additional input usage and while maintaining the same levels of risk. Besides, investment banks are found
to be more efficient than commercial banks mainly because of their superior managerial performance.1. Introduction
The banking industry plays a key role in modern economies. Banks
are financial intermediaries that gather deposits and other liabilities from
savers and transfer them to borrowers in the form of loans and other
financial assets. They share certain functions with financial markets, such
as resource allocation, reducing credit risk, intermediating maturity
differences, or bearing interest rate and exchange rate risk. Furthermore,
the banking industry faces three main sources of risk: credit risk, oper-
ational risk, and market risk. Banks' productive process as financial in-
termediaries and the risk inherent to banking should not be considered
individually, but rather jointly analysed. In this regard, existing research
shows that risk exerts a major influence on both the level and variability
of banks' performance; besides, these effects differ over time and across
countries (Sun and Chang, 2011).
In this research, we assess the technical efficiency of Brazilian banks
while accounting for risk, which is considered as an undesirable outcome
of banking. Besides, we study the difference in performance between
groups of banks and the sources of these differences, particularly dis-
tinguishing commercial banks from investment banks. In doing so, we
use non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques on a
sample of 124 Brazilian banks, and data for years 2014–19. Regarding
the contributions of the paper, while the analysis of efficiency in the
banking industry has received a great deal of attention in recent decades,
approaches accounting for risk as an undesirable by-product of bank-
ing—as our paper does—are much scarcer. Another contribution is the
assessment of the differences in performance between commercial andez-Hernandez).
orm 9 February 2021; Accepted
vier Ltd. This is an open access ainvestment banks and the sources of those differences, considering that
any increase in the production of conventional outputs is limited not only
by resource availability but also by the need to keep risk under control.
Moreover, as far as we know, no previous studies have taken risk into
account when examining the efficiency of Brazilian banks.
The Brazilian banking industry is the largest in the Latin American
and Caribbean region. Furthermore, the banking system has historically
played an important role as financial intermediary in Brazil given the
lack of development of financial markets, and particularly the corporate
bond market (Staub et al., 2010). The banking industry in this country
has undergone important structural transformation in recent decades,
which makes an analysis of its performance particularly interesting.
As in other major Latin American emerging countries, the 1990s in
Brazil were characterized by rapid economic development largely moti-
vated by the Washington Consensus. Moreover, privatizations, foreign
direct investment incentives, financial liberalization, price stabilization
and other reforms contributed to the integration of Brazil's domestic
financial market into international financial markets (De Paula, 2011).
The new regulation of the financial system enacted in 1988 allowed
banks to offer different financial services, universalizing their business.
In June 1994, the Brazilian government instituted a monetary reform
aimed at stabilizing prices—the so-called Real Plan—which led to a
profound reformulation of the banking sector (Almeida and Divino,
2015), and a notable increase in credit. The banking industry also wit-
nessed a number of mergers and acquisitions involving both domestic
and foreign banks (Baer and Nazmi, 2000). In August 1996, the Central
Bank of Brazil launched the PROES (Program of Incentives for the11 March 2021
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aimed at restructuring public banks; as a result of this programme only 12
of the 32 public banks that existed in 1994 remained operative in 2012
(Wolters et al., 2014).
Following this Introduction, Section 2 reviews existing literature on
banking performance and risk; Section 3 explains the methodology;
Section 4 describes the sample and the data; Section 5 presents and
discusses the results; finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Background
Previous literature has addressed the study of performance in the
banking industry from different angles and using a range of methodo-
logical approaches. Surveys in the field include Berger (2007), which
reviews the extant literature on the sources of differences in perfor-
mance, including measurement method and a number of bank, market,
and regulatory features; Paradi and Zhu (2013), which conducts a survey
on bank branch efficiency and performance research in 24 countries or
economic areas carried out with DEA; and, more recently, Aiello and
Bonanno (2018), which reviews the empirical literature on banking ef-
ficiency by conducting a meta-regression analysis from 120 papers
published over the period 2000–14. Without aiming to be exhaustive,
papers focused on the Brazilian banking industry include: Ceretta and
Niederauer (2001), Silva (2001), Silva and Neto (2002), Becker et al.
(2003), Macedo et al. (2005), Tabak et al. (2005), Ghilardi (2006), Souza
et al. (2006), Chabalgoity et al. (2007), Perico et al. (2008), Ruiz et al.
(2008), Souza et al. (2008), Souza and Macedo (2009), Staub et al.
(2010), Tecles and Tabak (2010), Wanke and Barros (2014), Wanke et al.
(2015), Perico et al. (2016), De Freitas Branco et al. (2017), Gomes et al.
(2017), and Henriques et al. (2018).
Regarding the contributions and main findings of these papers, Silva
(2001) analysed X-efficiency of Brazilian banks in the period
1994-99—after the implementation of the Real Plan—discovering a
certain variability in efficiency, mostly stemming from public banks.
Tecles and Tabak (2010) studied the post-privatization period 2000–07
finding that the negative profits reported by many banks in Brazil were
closely related to prior privatization waves; these authors also suggested
that large banks are the most cost and profit efficient, which supports the
concentration process observed in previous years. Staub et al. (2010)
found that the efficiency of the Brazilian banking industry in 2000–07
was lower than that of European and North American banks; and that
state-owned banks in Brazil were the most cost efficient. Wanke and
Barros (2014) analysed the efficiency of major Brazilian banks and its
drivers in 2012. The results brought to light the heterogeneity of the
banking industry in Brazil; also, mergers and acquisitions were found to
be the main driver of both productive and cost efficiency. Henriques et al.
(2018) evaluated the efficiency of 37 Brazilian banks in 2012–16 with
DEA, and the causes of inefficiency. The authors found large in-
efficiencies that are slightly more related to technical issues than to the
scale of operations; they also recommended fostering mergers and ac-
quisitions as a strategy to improve performance.
The structure of the banking industry worldwide and the relation-
ships among its players changed substantially from 2008, as a result of
several regulatory reforms oriented to addressing the moral hazard
problem arising from banks aiming to increase returns by taking
increasingly risky positions in the securities markets. In September 2010,
the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision passed new regulations for
capital requirements—Basel III. Back in 1988, Basel I had tackled the
impact of banks' capital regulations on their risk-taking performance.
These regulatory changes stimulated a line of research focused on
explaining the relationship between risk, capital and performance in
banking. The theoretical models underpinning empirical work are mainly
grounded on three hypotheses: i) the bad management hypothesis, which
holds that managing risk requires the use of resources that could other-
wise be dedicated to other productive activities (Williams, 2004); ii) the
bad luck hypothesis, which emphasizes the role of external triggers2
instead of managers' skills (Berger and DeYoung, 1997); and iii) themoral
hazard hypothesis, which posits that managers tend to take on more risk
when banks have lower levels of capital or they are less profit efficient
(Jeitschko and Jeung, 2005).
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) analysed the interrelationships among
banks' interest rate and credit risk-taking, capitalization, and efficiency;
their results support the moral hazard hypothesis. Williams (2004)
examined the intertemporal relationships between loan loss provision,
efficiency and capitalization for European banks between 1990 and
1998, with the findings supporting the bad management hypothesis. In
this regard, managers who engage in skimping behaviour reduce the use
of bank resources that are oriented to monitoring the lending business;
this influences the quality of loans and cost efficiency because bank
managers face a trade-off between short-term operating costs and future
loan quality. Fiordelisi et al. (2011) examined the inter-temporal link
between bank efficiency, capital and risk in European commercial banks
in 1997–2005. The results suggest that lower cost and revenue efficiency
causes higher bank risk. Tan and Floros (2013) studied the relations
among bank efficiency, capital and risk in Chinese commercial banks
over the period 2003–09. Their findings suggest that there is a positive
significant relationship between risk and efficiency, while the relation-
ship between risk and capitalization is negative and also significant.
In a different framework, Hughes and Mester (1998) found empirical
evidence that the managers of US banks use more labour and physical
capital in order to ensure better risk management and capital preserva-
tion, according to the bad management hypothesis. Altunbas et al. (2007)
studied the relation between capital, risk and efficiency of European
banks in the period 1992–2000, finding no empirical evidence of a
relationship between efficiency and bank risk-taking. Recently, Colesnic
et al. (2019) analysed the effect of risk on Middle East banks' efficiency
levels before and after the financial crisis of 2008. In doing so, they
defined an indicator of banks' risk efficiency which accounts for the in-
efficiency due to risk abatement cost—i.e., risk is considered as an un-
desirable or bad output in the banking production function (see Assaf
et al., 2013). The empirical findings suggest that large banks' risk man-
agement was more flexible during the financial crisis; most notably, the
authors advise that omitting risk may lead to biased estimates of banks'
efficiency.
3. Methodology
The study of performance in banking has been addressed using
different methodological approaches, notable among which are Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).
Both of these approaches have their pros and cons. DEA is a non-
parametric technique based on mathematical programming developed
by Charnes et al. (1978), which has been employed in hundreds of
empirical papers on efficiency assessment (for a recent survey see
Emrouznejad and Yang, 2018; see Paradi and Zhu, 2013 for those focused
on banking). Conversely, SFA is an approach simultaneously proposed by
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977), which is
grounded in the estimation of parametric production or cost functions.
According to Hjalmarsson et al. (1996, p.304), ‘…the choice between
different approaches [to performance assessment] must be based on
trade-offs concerning the purpose of the study, type of data, technology
characteristics, etc.’.
In our paper, we have decided in favour of non-parametric DEA pri-
marily due to its flexibility. In this regard, DEA does not require a
particular functional form to be established for either the technology or
the distribution of efficiency, which greatly facilitates the task of ac-
counting for risk as an undesirable output of banking
(Jimenez-Hernandez et al., 2019b). Instead, this technique allows a
surface to be built over a set of observed data on productive units—banks
in our case study—representing the best observed practices. All the
productive units in the sample are then projected onto this technological
frontier, yielding an indicator of performance (see details in Cooper et al.,
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‘...an elegant way of simultaneously constructing frontier technology from data
and calculating the distance to that frontier for individual observations or
activities’. Furthermore, a notable feature of DEA—which is particularly
relevant for the purpose of our research—is that it enables the compu-
tation of a range of measures of performance that might represent the
preferences of researchers or managers; in the case of this paper, how the
production of conventional outputs could be increased without
employing additional resources and also maintaining risk at observed
levels.3.1. Using DEA to assess performance in banking while accounting for risk
Let us assume that we observe a sample of b¼ 1,...,B banks using a set
of N inputs x 2 RNþ to obtain a vector of M good outputs represented by
y 2 RMþ . Transforming inputs into good outputs necessarily generates a
certain level of risk, which is represented by a set of H variables r 2 RHþ;
moreover, risk is considered as an undesirable or bad output from
banking.
The technology that models the transformation of inputs into good
outputs and bad outputs (risk) is represented by:
T¼ ½ðy; r; xÞj x can produceðy; rÞ (1)
It is assumed that the technology satisfies the axioms proposed by
Shephard (1970), including possibility of inaction, no free lunch, strong
disposability of inputs and good outputs, and convexity. Inputs, good
outputs and bad outputs are all considered to be non-negative. Further-
more, in order to model the joint production of good outputs and bad
outputs two further axioms are needed: null-jointness and weak dispos-
ability of outputs, both good and bad.
Null-jointnessmodels the idea that good outputs and bad outputs (risk)
are jointly produced (Shephard and F€are, 1974). Put simply, if banks
produce a positive amount of good outputs, some risk will also
unavoidably be assumed. In formal terms:
If ðy; r; xÞ 2T and r¼ 0; then y¼ 0 (2)
Weak disposability of outputs—desirable and undesirable—means that
reducing risk is not free, but it has an opportunity cost that can be
assessed in terms of a reduction in the potential amount of good outputs
produced. This is because resources such as employees or physical capital
that could otherwise be dedicated to producing good outputs ought to be
diverted to activities devoted to reducing risk. Formally:
If ðy; r; xÞ 2T and 0 α 1; thenðαy; αr; xÞ 2 T (3)
The relative position of each bank in the sample with respect to the
technology defined in expression (1) can be assessed, in terms of an in-
dicator of performance, using directional distance functions (DDFs). The
more general formulation of the DDF is (F€are and Grosskopf, 2000):
DDF
!¼ y; r; x; g¼ gy;  gr;  gx
¼ Supβyþ βgy; r βgr; x βgx
2T
(4)
This DDF generalizes both Shephard's input and output distance
functions (Shephard 1970) by jointly modelling good outputs, risk and
inputs. It thereby provides, in the most general setting, a measure of the
extent to which the good outputs could be increased in a direction gy,
while risk and inputs are respectively reduced in directions gx and  gr.
By construction, DDFs are lower bounded to zero. Other properties are
detailed in Chambers et al. (1998).1 Banking performance could also be assessed with alternative direction
vectors; e.g., reducing risk while maintaining the same level of inputs and good
outputs, or simultaneously reducing risk and inputs while maintaining or even
increasing good outputs.
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Let us now consider that we are interested in assessing banks' per-
formance in the presence of risk as the maximum proportional attainable
increase in the good outputs while maintaining the same level of risk and
input usage1; i.e., the good output-oriented approach. In this scenario,
the DDF of expression (4) becomes:
DDF
!¼½y; r; x; g¼ðy; 0; 0Þ¼Sup½βj〈ð1þ βÞy; r; x〉2T (5)
where g ¼ ðy; 0;0Þ is the direction vector that represents our preferences
on how to measure banks' performance.
By way of example, a computed score for the DDF from expression
(5)—parameter β—for a given bank of, let us say, 0.25 would mean that
by behaving efficiently this bank could proportionally increase its good
outputs by 25% without increasing risk and/or input usage. In terms of
the expression ð1þβÞ, the potential or efficient level of the good outputs
would be 1.25 times their observed level.
Alternatively, the technology can be characterized by assuming that
bad outputs (risk) are strongly (or freely) disposable, which allows us to
compute an indicator of the opportunity cost of reducing risk at the bank
level. Strong disposability of the bad outputs can be formalized as:
If ðy; r; xÞ 2T and 0 α 1; thenðy; αr; xÞ 2 T (6)
The assumption of strong disposability of bad outputs means, as pro-
posed by F€are et al. (1989), that reducing bads is costless; in simpler
words, risk can be reduced at no cost. Moreover, strong disposability
disrupts the physical link between good outputs and risk, rendering the
null-jointness hypothesis unnecessary. In the real world, this would make
little sense since there is always an association between good outputs and
risk in banking; e.g., no loans can be made without assuming some risk,
no matter how small. Accordingly, strong disposability needs to be un-
derstood in terms of costs, as F€are et al. (1989) themselves emphasized.
By comparing the DDFs of expression (5) computed with respect to
technologies characterized by both weak (DDF
!W
) and strong dispos-
ability (DDF
!S
), we can compute an indicator of the opportunity cost of
reducing risk at the bank level, expressed in terms of potential good
output losses. Formally, for good output m, this indicator is:






This indicator measures potential losses of good outputs due to weak
disposability, and by construction is equal to or larger than zero. A
positive value indicates that weak disposability of bads is reducing the
potential increases in the good outputs; i.e., reducing risk requires the use
of resources that otherwise could be dedicated to producing the good
outputs.
Figure 1 graphically depicts the technologies under weak and strong
disposability, and the assessment of potential output losses. For the sakeFigure 1. Strong and weak disposability of outputs.
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use the same vector of inputs to produce one good output (y) and one bad
output (risk) (r). The technology that satisfies the assumptions of weak
disposability and null-jointness (TW) is bounded by OABO0, whereas the
technology where the good and bad outputs are strongly (freely)
disposable (TS) is bounded by OO’B and the horizontal segment that goes
from B until the vertical good-output axis. Furthermore, bank C is inef-
ficient with respect to both technologies, as it is producing in an inner
point of the output set.
Projecting the observed production plan of bank C toward the frontier
of TS in the good output direction yields—according to expression (5)—
point C’’. This means that when reducing risk is assumed to be costless,
the potential good output of bank C would be ð1þβSÞ times its observed
level if it acted efficiently; in other words, the good output could be
increased by a proportion of βS, a quantity equivalent to the segment
CC’’. On the other hand, when it is assumed that reducing risk is costly,
the potential increase in the good output when point C is projected onto
the frontier of TW comes down to the proportion βW; or by the corre-
sponding quantity CC’. This reduction of the efficient good output due to
the weak disposability of risk is just what expression (7) measures; i.e.,
the loss of potential good output given by C’C’’.
In practice, computing the DDFs involved in our assessment of
banking efficiency under the weak disposability axiom (TW) and a di-
rection that increases the good outputs, while maintaining productive
resources and risk at observed levels, entails solving the following pro-
gram for each bank b:
DDF
















ðzb þ μbÞxnb n ¼ 1;…;N ðiiiÞ
XB
b¼1
ðzb þ μbÞ ¼ 1 ðivÞ
zb; μb  0 b ¼ 1;…;B ðvÞ
In program (8) variable returns to scale (VRS) are imposed through
restriction (iv) (Banker et al., 1984).2 Nonetheless, as noted by Zago and
Donceli (2011, p.542), the standard DEA-based specification grounded
on VRS prevents the technology from satisfying weak disposability of
both good and bad outputs (risk), thus hindering the usage of our
risk-augmented model of performance. In order to overcome this weak-
ness, we have used the approach proposed by Kuosmanen (2005) (see
also Kuosmanen and Podinovski, 2009), which allows performance
assessment with VRS and weak disposability; accordingly, μb denotes the
so-called scale effect, and zb stands for the efficient effect (further technical
details are in Kuosmanen, 2005, p.1079–80).
Likewise, computing the DDFs against a technology with strong
disposability (TS) and the abovementioned direction vector that increases
the good outputs, while maintaining inputs and risk, requires solving the
following program, also for each bank b:2 VRS is a common assumption in performance analyses in the banking in-
dustry (Barros et al., 2012). In practice, VRS means that each bank is compared
against other observed banks of a similar size—or linear combinations of the
production plan of two or more such observed banks—instead of against all
banks in the sample. Given the large differences in size that exist in the Brazilian
banking industry, in our opinion VRS is the most sensible assumption.
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DDF
















λbxnb n ¼ 1;…;N ðiiiÞ
XB
b¼1
λb ¼ 1 ðivÞ
λb  0 b ¼ 1;…;B ðvÞ
with λb standing for the elements of the so-called intensities vector.3.2. The metatechnology approach
One crucial assumption in Section 3.1 is that all banks in the sample
share a common technology. However, certain banks may have no access
to some production plans within the common technology due to regu-
lations or other physical, social or economic factors in their environment.
In such cases, the question arises as to whether their inefficiency is due to
poor management or rather to the restrictions imposed by these envi-
ronmental factors. The metafrontier approach by O'Donnell et al. (2008)
allows some light to be shed on this question.
Let us define the metatechnology (MT) as the set of all feasible com-
binations of inputs, good outputs and risk available to the banking in-
dustry according to the state-of-knowledge, as defined in expression (1).
It is assumed that the metatechnology also satisfies the axioms of null-
jointness and weak disposability of outputs. The directional metadistance
function (DMDF) can be computed against the metatechnology according
to expression (5) in the particular case of assuming a direction that in-
creases the good output while keeping inputs and risk the same. These
DMDFs are assumed to fulfil the same properties as DDFs.
Furthermore, let us consider that the banks in our sample can be
grouped into g ¼ 1,…,G categories, according to criteria relating to
features of their operating environment. As already noted, the central
issue is that belonging to a given group might prevent banks from having
access to the entire set of feasible production plans in the metatechnol-
ogy. That said, the technology of group g under weak disposability3
representing the set of feasible production plans available to banks in that
group is:
TWg ¼ ½ðy; r; xÞjx can be used by banks in group g to produceðy; rÞ
(10)
Having defined the technology for group g, the DDF that allows us to
compute the potential increase in the good outputs while maintaining the
same level of inputs and risk with respect to the technology of that group
is:
DDF
!g ¼ ½y; r; x; g¼ðy; 0; 0Þ¼ Sup½βWg〈ð1þ βWgÞy; r; x〉2TWg (11)
By way of example, a computed score for the expression ð1þβWgÞ for a
bank belonging to group g of, let us say, 1.1 would indicate that it could
increase its good outputs by 10%, while maintaining the same level of
risk and with no additional input usage, when compared to best observed
practices within its own group. The DDF computed with respect to the
technology of group g will be, by construction, always equal to or lower3 In the metatechnology approach we only define the technology with the
assumption of weak disposability since it represents the real world in which
reducing risk is costly.
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bank to expand its good outputs when it is compared to the meta-
technology will always be greater than that obtained when it is compared
to banks in its own group.
Comparing the DMDFs obtained with respect to the metatechnology
with the DDFs computed relative to the group frontiers allows us to
define the metatechnology ratio for group g as:4





Expression (12) measures how close the technological frontier of
group g is from the metafrontier, assessed in a direction that increases the
good outputs while keeping both input usage and risk the same. As
pointed out by O'Donnell et al. (2008, p.237), this approach allows for a
suitable decomposition of overall performance, assessed with respect to
themetafrontier, into i)managerial performance, measuredwith respect to
the group technology; and ii) group performance, measured by the meta-
technology ratio. In formal terms:
Overall performance ¼ Managerial performanceg  Group performanceg
(13)
For illustrative purposes, an overall performance score of 1.5 for a
given bank wouldmean that it could increase its good outputs by 50% for
given inputs and risk. This score could be the result of, let us say: i) a
managerial performance score of 1.2, meaning that using the best prac-
tices available to banks in its own group, the good outputs could be
increased by 20%; and ii) a group performance score of 1.25, which
means that, once the efficient levels of the good outputs against the group
technology have been reached, an additional increase of 25% over those
levels could be achieved if this bank used the best practices in the entire
set of production plans available to the banking industry, given by the
metatechnology.
Figure 2 graphically depicts this decomposition. Let us assume that
banks in our sample can be classified into two groups: banks A, B and C
(represented by dots) belong to group 1, while banks D, E and F (denoted
by asterisks) belong to group 2. Efficient banks A and B and their convex
combinations shape the technological frontier of group 1, which is given
by the segment OABO’; likewise, the technological frontier of group 2 is
ODEO”, which is shaped by efficient banks D and E and their convex
combinations. It is also assumed that the metatechnology, or techno-
logical frontier for the whole sample, coincides with the frontier of
group 1.
Let us now assess the performance of bank F belonging to group 2.
Projecting its production plan onto the technological frontier of the group
to which it belongs in, let us say, a North direction, yields point F’; i.e., by
efficiently using the technology available to banks in its group bank F
could attain a potential good output ð1þβWgÞ times its observed level; in
other words, the good output could be increased by a proportion of βWg
(managerial performance). Similarly, projecting onto the metafrontier
yields point F00, indicating that if bank F had access to the entire set of
production plans in the metatechnology, it could achieve a good output
of ð1þβWÞ times its observed level; or a proportional increase of βW
(overall performance). The difference between the good outputs at points
F0 and F00 is a measure of the effect on performance of belonging to a
particular group (group performance).
Using DEA, the metadistance functions involved in the calculation of
the technology ratio of expression (12) can be directly computed from
program (8) using the entire sample of banks; likewise, computing the4 In order to avoid infeasibilities due to banks with DDFs equal to zero with
respect to the technology of their own group, both the numerator and the de-
nominator of the metatechnology ratio are formulated as one plus the direc-
tional function, either distance or metadistance function.
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distances with respect to group technologies requires running program
(8) using only the sample of banks belonging to each group.
4. The production function in banking: data, variables and
sample
4.1. The production function in the banking industry
The existing literature has considered two main approaches to char-
acterize the production function in the banking industry: the production
approach and the intermediation approach. The former considers banks
as firms that produce deposits and loan account services from traditional
inputs; e.g., physical capital and labour. Conversely, the intermediation
approach regards banks as financial intermediaries between savers and
investors, which secure deposits and other funds and use them to produce
different types of loans and other assets.
In this research, we use the intermediation approach (Sealey and
Lindley, 1977), which is the most habitual in analyses of banking per-
formance. Besides, we follow the asset approach for the selection of in-
puts and outputs, which considers banks as financial intermediaries only
between liability holders and those who receive bank funds. Loans and
other assets are considered bank outputs, whereas deposits and other
liabilities play the role of inputs in the intermediation process (Berger
and Humphrey, 1992).
Based on the abovementioned arguments, the inputs included in our
characterization of the banking production function are i) staff expenses,
to account for labour, and ii) non-earning assets, as a proxy of physical
capital; in addition, we incorporate three financial inputs iii) equity; iv)
customer deposits; and v) market liabilities, calculated as the sum of bank
deposits, derivative financial instruments and trading liabilities. It should
be noted that we have included a wide range of bank liabilities in order to
account for the inputs of both commercial banks—which usually have a
bigger role in the retail market—and investment banks—which are
traditionally more market-oriented. On the other hand, conventional or
good outputs are i) gross loans and ii) securities.
Finally, our variable accounting for the risk intrinsic to banking ac-
tivity is the standard deviation of the return on assets (ROA), computed at
the bank level over a five-year window. Furthermore, in order to perform
a robustness analysis of our results we also consider the standard devi-
ation of the return on equity (ROE) as an alternative measure of risk (see
Liu et al., 2012). In both cases, a larger deviation represents higher risk.4.2. Data and sample
The empirical analysis carried out in this research is based on data
from Moody's Analytics BankFocus, a database that includes information
about 55,700 banks worldwide. It is managed by the Bureau van Dijk andFigure 2. Performance, distance/metadistance functions and the metatechnol-
ogy ratio.
7 The DDFs have been computed using the DJL package in R software.
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reports, information delivered by banks and regulatory sources. The
dataset includes accounting and financial statistics that are highly suit-
able for making comparisons between banks, and also offer good
coverage of the Brazilian banking industry.
According to this dataset, a total of 165 banks were operating in Brazil
in the year 2019. The industry is highly concentrated as the five largest
banks account for about 80% of total banking assets. Furthermore, the
market is largely dominated by domestic institutions, both private and
public. In fact, the five largest banks in terms of assets—Banco do Brasil,
Itaú, Caixa Economica Federal (CEF), Bradesco and BNDES—are do-
mestic; moreover, CEF and BNDES are majority state-owned. It is also
worth highlighting the notable role in the Brazilian banking industry
played by banks providing several banking services, including retail
services, investment banking services, and brokerage services.
To build our sample, we have used yearly data from 2014 to 2019
inclusive for Brazilian banks in the BankFocus dataset.5 At the time of
writing this paper, 2019 was the last year for which data were available.
Moreover, given the serious lack of data for some banks prior to 2014, it
was considered advisable not to extend the sample any further back as its
representativeness could be affected. It is important, however, to high-
light that the use of data from several years is not primarily intended to
analyse the time dimension of performance in the Brazilian banking in-
dustry, but to overcome a common limitation of DEA. This approach
suffers from a lack of discrimination power when there is a small number
of observations relative to the number of inputs and outputs; and this
could be the case with our empirical application6 (see Dyson et al., 2001,
for details). Including more observations in the sample by considering the
time dimension of the data is expected to greatly improve the discrimi-
nation power of our DEA-based models (Cooper et al., 2007;
Jimenez-Hernandez et al., 2019a). That said, it also entails the assump-
tion that no significant technical change occurred over the period
2014–2019, which, in our view, is fairly plausible.
Thus, after removing banks with missing data for some of the vari-
ables defined in Section 4.1, and detecting and eliminating outliers by
means of scatter plots and the trimmean function applied to 5% of the
observations, our final dataset includes information on 124 Brazilian
banks over the abovementioned six-year period. All bank and year ob-
servations have been pooled into a single sample. Moreover, given that
data for some of the banks are not available in particular years, our final
dataset includes a total of 543 observations. This final sample represents
97% of the total assets of Brazilian banks included in the Moody's Ana-
lytics BankFocus dataset for the period analysed; and 67% of the bank-
s—a percentage that goes up to 75% in the year 2019, for which more
data are available. Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the
variables that represent the production process in banking. The high
standard deviations of some of these variables brings to light the large
size differences among the banks operating in the Brazilian banking
industry.
5. Results and discussion
The results for the technical efficiency of Brazilian banks in the
sample under both weak and strong disposability assumptions, in addi-
tion to potential good output losses, are in Table 2. These results have
been obtained from programs (8) and (9) with the standard deviation of
ROA computed over a five-year window, which includes the year to5 Last access to the data was carried out through https://www.bvdinfo.com/e
n-us/our-products/data/international/bankfocus on January 14, 2021.
6 Since our sample includes banks performing different activities, an unusu-
ally large number of inputs and outputs—including risk—need to be considered
in the technology. Moreover, the metatechnology approach requires separately
computing scores of performance for particular groups of banks—e.g., com-
mercial and investment—which also reduces the sample size in some programs.
6
which the observation belongs and the four previous years, as a measure
of risk; and from expression (7) for the potential output loss.7 Above all,
the low technical efficiency of the banking industry in Brazil stands out.
In the scenario where it is assumed that reducing risk requires the use of
resources that otherwise could be devoted to producing good outputs,
banks in the sample could increase their loans and securities by a pro-
portion of 65.1%, on average, without further usage of inputs and
maintaining the same level of risk. The low efficiency of Brazilian banks
has also been reported in previous studies such as Tabak et al. (2005),
Souza et al. (2006) and, more recently, Henriques et al. (2018). However,
the contribution of our research is that technical efficiency is evaluated
while accounting for risk, which allows a more accurate assessment of
performance.
Conversely, when it is assumed that reducing risk is a costless activity,
the average proportional potential increase in the good outputs that could
be achieved without consuming additional inputs is 69.1%, regardless of
the level of risk. This finding clearly shows how reducing risk has a
sizeable opportunity cost measured as a lower feasible expansion of the
good outputs, thus supporting the badmanagement hypothesis, proposed
by Williams (2004). The extent of the potential output loss due to weak
disposability of risk can be interpreted as a reduction of 4 percentage
points in the efficient level of the good outputs, on average.8
Several papers focused on the analysis of performance in the Brazilian
banking industry have assessed the differences in efficiency between
groups of banks. According to the information provided by the Moody's
Analytics BankFocus dataset, in our sample of 543 observations, 427
correspond to commercial banks whereas 116 are categorized as in-
vestment banks.9 Moreover, 240 observations are identified as belonging
to domestic banks, while 196 correspond to foreign banks; finally, 445
observations belong to private banks and only 12 to public ones.10
Table 3 displays the estimated scores of technical efficiency by groups
of banks. It is worth highlighting that these scores of technical efficiency
correspond to the scenario of weak disposability, which represents the
real world where reducing risk consumes productive resources. At first
glance, investment banks (score of 1.563, indicating that by behaving
efficiently banks in this group could proportionally increase their good
outputs by an average of 56.3%, without additional input usage and also
maintaining the same level of risk) seem to perform better than com-
mercial banks (score of 1.675); domestic banks (1.626) also achieve
better performance than foreign ones (1.687); and finally, public banks
(1.198) seem to be more technically efficient than private ones (1.693).
These results are in line with Souza et al. (2006), which found Brazilian
domestic banks to be more efficient than foreign ones, and Wanke and
Barros (2014), which concluded that public ownership correlates with
larger efficiency. However, given the large standard deviations of our
efficiency scores, the question arises as to whether the abovementioned
differences are statistically significant.
In order to further investigate this issue, we employ the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test of the equality of distributions, and the Mann–Whitney test
that checks the hypothesis that two samples come from the same popu-
lation (see Conover, 1999). In addition, we apply the Simar–Zelenyuk–Li
test (Simar and Zelenyuk, 2006), which was explicitly designed for
testing the equality of distributions of technical efficiency scores calcu-
lated using DEA. In essence, the algorithm of this test is based on the8 This output loss would amount to an average potential increase in loans by
bank and year of 356.8 million constant 2019 $US; and 197.1 million of
securities.
9 Brazilian banks normally provide several banking services, including retail
services, investment banking services, and brokerage services, as noted in Sec-
tion 4.2. However, they have been categorized as commercial or investment
banks according to their main activity reported to Moody's Analytics.
10 For some of the banks in the sample, information regarding the ownership of
capital—domestic versus foreign, or private versus public—is not provided by our
source of data.
Table 1. Sample description (constant 2019 $US million).
Mean Standard deviation
Inputs
Staff expenses 334 1,196
Non-earning assets 3,779 13,894
Equity 1,804 5,788
Customer deposits 6,179 23,792





Standard deviation of ROA 1.91 3.54
Standard deviation of ROE 8.87 16.94
Source: Authors' elaboration from Moody's Analytics BankFocus.
Table 2. Estimates of technical efficiency (1 best) and potential output loss.
Mean Standard deviation
Weak disposability assumption ð1þβWÞ 1.651 0.780
Strong disposability assumption ð1þβSÞ 1.691 0.809
Potential good output loss ðβS  βWÞ 0.040 0.157
Source: Authors' elaboration.
Table 3. Estimates of technical efficiency (1 best) by groups of banks under the weak disposability assumption ð1þβWÞ.
Mean Standard deviation
Commercial banks 1.675 0.785
Investment banks 1.563 0.753
Domestic banks 1.626 0.690
Foreign banks 1.687 0.860
Private banks 1.693 0.794
Public banks 1.198 0.293
Source: Authors' elaboration.
11 Jimenez-Hernandez et al. (2019b) also employed this approach to assess the
differences of efficiency in the management of non-performing loans between
cooperative and commercial banks in the Latin American and Caribbean
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estimates, where scores equal to unity have been previously smoothed by
adding a small noise component. The results are in Table 4. All three tests
suggest that the difference of performance between commercial and in-
vestment banks is statistically significant. Besides, the results from both
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann–Whitney tests point to the lack of
significance of the difference in performance between domestic and
foreign banks, although the Simar–Zelenyuk–Li test suggests weak sig-
nificance, only at 10%. Finally, the technical efficiency of Brazilian pri-
vate banks is statistically different from that of public ones, according to
the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann–Whitney tests, but not
the Simar–Zelenyuk–Li test.
Given the aforesaid results, we can state with a high degree of confi-
dence that Brazilian commercial banks perform differently from invest-
ment banks. However, reasonable doubts arise concerning the differences
in performance between domestic and foreign banks, on the one hand,
and between private and public banks, on the other. In the first case, only
the Simar–Zelenyuk–Li testfinds the difference to be (weakly) statistically
significant. In the second, the reason is twofold: the Simar–Zelenyuk–Li
test does not support the statistical significance of this difference, and this
test is specifically designed for efficiency scores such as those calculated in
this research; and there are only 12 observations in the group of public
banks—belonging to the 2 banks observed over the period 2014-
2019—which seriously limits the representativeness in this group.7
Accordingly, the following question arises: Why do Brazilian investment
banks perform better than commercial ones?
5.1. Commercial versus investment banks: managerial or group
performance?
In Section 3.1 it was assumed that all banks in the sample share a
common technology, regardless of the group to which they belong.
However, in practice it might be the case that, due to particular envi-
ronmental circumstances, some banks do not have access to the complete
set of production plans available in the common technology. Thus, the
question arises as to whether their inefficiency is due to poor manage-
ment or to the technological restrictions imposed by such environmental
factors. In this regard, the metafrontier approach developed in Section
3.2. helps us to further investigate the differences in performance be-
tween Brazilian commercial and investment banks.
Table 5 displays the results of decomposing the overall technical ef-
ficiency of commercial and investment banks as the result of managerial
efficiency and group efficiency.11 As already pointed out, the averages ofbanking industry; see also Jimenez-Hernandez et al. (2019a).
Table 5. Managerial efficiency versus group efficiency (1 best).
Commercial banks Investment banks
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Overall efficiency ð1þβWÞ 1.675 0.785 1.563 0.753
Managerial efficiency ð1þβWgÞ 1.503 0.638 1.224 0.398
Group efficiency ð1þβWÞ= ð1þβWgÞ 1.109 0.227 1.250 0.367
Source: Authors' elaboration.
Table 4. Statistical significance of the differences in technical efficiency.(1)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-statistic)(2) Mann-Whitney test (Z-statistic)(3) Simar-Zelenyuk-Li test (Li-statistic)(4)
Commercial versus investment 0.168 (0.010)*** -2.128 (0.033)** 2.676 (0.003)***
Domestic versus foreign 0.105 (0.164) -0.182 (0.855) 1,363 (0.086)*
Private versus public 0.359 (0.073)* -2.140 (0.032)** 0.188 (0.425)
Source: Authors' elaboration.
* means significance at 10%.
(1) P-values are in parentheses; *** and ** mean significance at 1% and 5%, respectively.
(2) Null hypothesis: the two samples have the same distribution; the exact p-values are computed.
(3) Null hypothesis: the two samples are drawn from the same population. Z-statistic adjusted for ties.
(4) Original estimates are smoothed using the algorithm II in Simar and Zelenyuk (2006, p.508).
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1.563, respectively, with the difference being statistically significant.
Furthermore, when commercial banks are compared to best observed
practices in their group, their managerial efficiency is, on average, 1.503;
this score indicates that if all managers of commercial banks in the
sample performed as efficiently as the best managers in the group, the
good outputs could be increased by an average of 50.3% while main-
taining input usage and risk the same. Average managerial efficiency for
investment banks is 1.224, suggesting a potential increase in the good
outputs of 22.4%. Although these figures cannot be directly compared to
each other since they have been computed relative to different fron-
tiers—i.e., the technologies of commercial banks and investment banks,
respectively—they allow us to assert that, on average, the managers of
investment banks are operating closer to their technological frontier than
commercial bank managers are to theirs.
Comparing the scores of technical efficiency relative to both the
metafrontier and the group frontiers allows the calculation of the meta-
technology ratio for all banks in the sample, or group efficiency. As
explained in Section 3.2, these ratios evaluate how close the technologies
of investment banks and commercial banks are to the metatechnology or
common technology, thus permitting an assessment of which technology
is more efficient. According to our results, the average group efficiency of
commercial banks is 1.109; this score indicates that even after reaching
the level of the good outputs enabled by the best practices available to
managers of commercial banks, a further increase of 10.9% over this
level could still be achieved if the banks had access to the entire set of
production plans in the metatechnology. Average group efficiency for
investment banks is 1.250, pointing to an additional potential increase in
the good outputs of 25%.
But is the difference in group efficiency between commercial and
investment banks statistically significant? According to the results from
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney tests reported in Table 6, it
is significant. Nonetheless, it is not significant according to the Simar-
Zelenyuk-Li test, which, let us once again recall, is specifically
designed for the type of efficiency scores computed in this research.
Hence, we cannot robustly demonstrate that the technologies of Brazilian
commercial and investment banks are different. In this regard, there have
been historical technological differences between commercial banks and
investment banks, mostly due to regulation and different operational
capabilities. However, banking legislation has become less restrictive8
over the years, with a global trend towards the universal banking model;
this shift might have narrowed the technological differences between
commercial and investment banks.
All in all, our results suggest that when technical efficiency is assessed
while accounting for risk, Brazilian investment banks are more efficient
than commercial banks. The reason is that investment banks have better
managers—in the sense that they operate closer to their technological
frontier representing best practices in the group—since no significant
differences are found in the technology used by the two groups of banks.
Finally, the sensitivity of our findings to changes in the variable used
to measure risk has been assessed by using the standard deviation of ROE
instead of the deviation of ROA. This alternative scenario yields the same
conclusions as those set out in the previous paragraphs. The numerical
results are in the Appendix.
6. Conclusions
The study of performance in the banking industry has a deep-rooted
tradition in the field of Economics. Since the 1980s, a bourgeoning
literature has arisen devoted to analysing banks' performance from
diverse approaches and perspectives. However, the related literature is
less prolific when it comes to analysing the relationship between per-
formance and risk. Although this matter has received increasing attention
from researchers in the last two decades, there are still gaps that require
further investigation.
This paper assesses the technical efficiency of Brazilian banks while
accounting for risk. Our theoretical background is the bad management
hypothesis posed by Williams (2004), which stresses that the man-
agement of risk requires the use of resources that could otherwise be
dedicated to other productive activities; accordingly, efficiency is not
independent of the risk levels that banks assume. Risk is proxied by the
standard deviation of the return on assets (ROA). Furthermore,
risk-conditioned scores of technical efficiency are calculated under two
key assumptions, namely, that banking intermediation services cannot
be produced without assuming a certain level of risk, whether high or
low; and that risk can be treated as an undesirable or bad output from
banking to be minimized. Regarding the methodology, non-parametric
frontier techniques based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) are
applied to a sample of 124 Brazilian banks and data for the period
2014–19.
Table 6. Statistical significance of the differences in group efficiency.(1)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-statistic)(2) Mann-Whitney test (Z-statistic)(3) Simar-Zelenyuk-Li test (Li-statistic)(4)
Commercial versus investment 0.190 (0.002)*** 2.871 (0.004)*** 0.371 (0.355)
Source: Authors' elaboration.
(1) P-values are in parentheses; *** mean significance at 1%.
(2) Null hypothesis: the two samples have the same distribution; the exact p-values are computed.
(3) Null hypothesis: the two samples are drawn from the same population. Z-statistic adjusted for ties.
(4) Original estimates are smoothed using the algorithm II in Simar and Zelenyuk (2006, p.508).
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on average, rather inefficient, although cross-bank differences are
important. Moreover, an opportunity cost of maintaining risk at observed
levels is found, which provides empirical support to the bad management
hypothesis, and shows how assessing banking efficiency without prop-
erly accounting for risk could lead to biased results. Furthermore, we find
robust statistical evidence that Brazilian investment banks perform better
than commercial ones. Besides, domestic and foreign banks do not
exhibit significant differences in performance; this result—which is in
line with the findings reported by Saez-Fernandez et al. (2015) for the
Latin American and Caribbean banking industry—is perhaps a conse-
quence of the successful adaptation of Brazilian domestic banks to the
process of external opening and liberalization that began in the 1990s
with the Washington Consensus.
Additionally, we find that investment banks outperform commercial
ones because their managers are operating closer to the best practices
available to them than commercial bank managers are to theirs;
accordingly, no robust empirical evidence is found that the technologies
of the two groups of banks are different. Put more simply, investment
banks are more technically efficient because of their superior managerial
performance. Although we have no clear-cut explanations for this
finding, it could be related to the greater degree of specialization of in-
vestment banks, which would generate comparative advantages. In-
vestment banks may also have better qualified managers, which would
seem essential given the type of clients they serve and the set of banking
services offered.
It is our hope that the results from this research will provide bank
managers and regulators of the banking industry in Brazil with sound
information that can help them to improve both management and reg-
ulatory policies. In this regard, up to the best of our knowledge, we
contribute the first assessment of Brazilian banks' performance ac-
counting for risk, an intrinsic feature of financial activity that is dis-
playing a growing trend in this turbulent new stage of the globalization
era. Beyond this contribution, our research is not without its limitations,
which may however pave the way for future work. We consider that
further investigation is needed into the risk-conditioned performance of
the Brazilian banking industry, using different methodological9
approaches and concepts of efficiency and risk. Moreover, a more in-
depth analysis—i.e., using larger samples and more powerful statistical
tests—of the possible differences in technology between groups of en-
tities, as well as the causes of investment banks' superior performance in
managerial efficiency, would also be welcome.
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No additional information is available for this paper.AppendixTable A1. Robustness check: Scores of technical efficiency (1 best) and potential output loss with ROE.
Mean Standard deviationWeak disposability axiom ð1þβWÞ 1.639 0.774
Strong disposability axiom ð1þβSÞ 1.695 0.816
Potential good output loss ðβS  βWÞ 0.056 0.197Source: Authors' elaboration.
F.J. Saez-Fernandez et al. Heliyon 7 (2021) e06524Table A2. Robustness check: Statistical significance of the differences in technical efficiency.(1)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-statistic)(2) Mann-Whitney test (Z-statistic)(3) Simar-Zelenyuk-Li test (Li-statistic)(4)10Commercial versus investment 0.174 (0.007)*** -2.165 (0.030)** 2.878 (0.002)***Domestic versus foreign 0.101 (0.198) -0.356 (0.721) 1.406 (0.079)*Private versus public 0.363 (0.068)* -1.990 (0.046)** 0.163 (0.434)Source: Authors' elaboration.
* means significance at 10%.
(1) P-values are in parentheses; *** and ** mean significance at 1% and 5%, respectively.
(2) Null hypothesis: the two samples have the same distribution; the exact p-values are computed.
(3) Null hypothesis: the two samples are drawn from the same population. Z-statistic adjusted for ties.
(4) Original estimates are smoothed using the algorithm II in Simar and Zelenyuk (2006, p.508).
Table A3. Robustness check: Managerial efficiency versus group efficiency (1 best), with ROE.
Commercial banks Investment banksMean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviationOverall efficiency ð1þβWÞ 1.664 0.780 1.549 0.746
Managerial efficiency ð1þβWgÞ 1.490 0.623 1.174 0.348
Group efficiency ð1þβWÞ= ð1þβWgÞ 1.110 0.231 1.295 0.425Source: Authors' elaboration.
Table A4. Robustness check: Statistical significance of the differences in overall efficiency and group efficiency(1) between commercial and investment banks, with ROE.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-statistic)(2) Mann-Whitney test (Z-statistic)(3) Simar-Zelenyuk-Li test (Li-statistic)(4)Group efficiency 0.211 (0.001)*** 3.101 (0.001)*** 0.452 (0.325)Source: Authors' elaboration.
(1) P-values are in parentheses; *** mean significance at 1%.
(2) Null hypothesis: the two samples have the same distribution; exact p-values are computed.
(3) Null hypothesis: the two samples are drawn from the same population; Z-statistic adjusted for ties.
(4) Original estimates are smoothed using the algorithm II in Simar and Zelenyuk (2006, p.508).References
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